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Israel’s flawed intelligence
assessment in October 1973 has been studied intensively and been
the subject of much public and professional debate. Israel’s
Intelligence Assessment before the Yom Kippur War adds a unique
dimension to previously disclosed material, as its author served
as head of the Research Branch of Israeli Military Intelligence
on the eve of and during the Yom Kippur War and as such was responsible
for the national intelligence assessment at the time. Drawing on
his personal records, and on interviews and extensive research conducted
in the intervening decades, Aryeh Shalev examines the preconceptions
and common beliefs that prevailed among Israeli intelligence officials
and ultimately contributed to their flawed assessment: the excessive
self-confidence in Israel’s prowess, particularly in the aftermath
of the Six Day War; the confidence that any surprise attack could
be repelled with the regular army until the reserves were mobilized;
the accepted profile of Sadat as a weak leader with limited powers
and initiative; and the belief in Israel’s correct understanding
of Egyptian and Syrian operational plans.
… Beyond explaining where Israeli intelligence erred, the
book probes expectations of military intelligence in general and
the relationship between military and political assessments. It
considers what kind of assessment an intelligence branch is capable
of producing with a great degree of certainty, and conversely, what
kind of assessment it should not be asked to produce. Based on the
intelligence failure of the Yom Kippur War, this book also reviews
possible organizational changes and methodological improvements
to guard as much as possible against surprise attacks in the future,
relevant not only to Israel’s circumstances but to all countries
with enemies capable of launching an attack.
Published in association with the Institute for National Strategic Studies
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Preface
Acknowledgments Introduction
Part I Israel’s Security Concept and
the Intelligence Concept
1 Israel’s Security Concept and its Limitations
2 The Intelligence Concept
Part II Arab Military Preparations for
War through the Intelligence Prism
3 Basic Intelligence
4 Formulating the Intelligence Picture
5 The Essence of Warning
Part III Intelligence Assessments and
the Decision Makers
6 Is Egypt Starting a War?
7 Warning from a Particular High Placed Source
8 Assessment of Readiness and Assessment of Intentions
9 Meetings with the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister,
and the Chief of the General Staff
Part IV The Mistakes and the Failures
10 Intelligence’s Mistaken Assessment
11 The Reasons for the Intelligence Failure
Part V The Difficulties of Intelligence Work
12 Basic Issues in the Intelligence Branch
13 Problems with the Intelligence Assessment before the Yom
Kippur War
Part VI Proposed Lessons
14 Responsibility for Assessment of Intentions: The Role of
the Leadership
15 Organizational Lessons
16 Lessons on Working Methods
Conclusion
Appendix A: Israel and the Arab States:
Important Dates between the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur
War
Appendix B: Intelligence Products in the Period before 238
the Yom Kippur War
Appendix C: Emerging Lessons in a Meeting with the 244 Intelligence
Branch Director one Month after the Outbreak of the War
Appendix D: Personal Letter from Intelligence Branch Director
Major General Aharon Yariv to the Author, 27 September 1972
Appendix E: Letter in Praise of this Book by Lieutenant General
(ret.) Moshe Yaalon, while Serving as Chief of General Staff
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
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| “There was no lack
of intelligence; it was the interpretation to the reports
that was faulty.” U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Henry
Kissinger, commenting on Israel’s Yom Kippur débâcle
The following review excerpt from the Israel Journal
of Foreign Affairs includes comments on The
Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War: An Analysis by Dani
Asher
(Jefferson: McFarland Press, 2009)
“Shalev, who refreshingly takes responsibility for his own
and Aman’s shortcomings with respect to the benign assessment
of Egyptian–Syrian political intentions on the eve of the
war, is on firm ground when he speculates that it might well have
made no difference if the intelligence branch had come to the opposite
conclusion, because both the IDF high command and the civilian government
were so deeply invested in the concept and because they believed
so strongly in the standing army’s capability to defend the
Sinai and Golan without the reserves. And he is certainly being
reasonable when he claims that the civilian government, which bears
the final responsibility for all decisions concerning war, is at
least as culpable as Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence) and the
IDF high command for the Yom Kippur War debacle. Asher, on the other
hand, perhaps because he was not personally involved in prewar intelligence
assessments about Egyptian–Syrian political intentions, takes
no particular position on the issue of personal accountability.
… These two volumes, in sum, nicely
complement each other. One demonstrates how Egypt’s massive
military defeat in 1967 resulted in meticulous self-examination
and innovation, while the other demonstrates how Israel’s
tremendous military victory bred smug self-satisfaction and stasis.
Asher and Shalev are to be commended for their efforts to cast new
light on the contrasting mindsets that animated Egypt, Syria, and
Israel before the Yom Kippur War.” Reviewed by David Rodman,
Analyst of Israeli defense and diplomatic policy
“The author of this study was director of the Israeli Defense
Force’s Intelligence Research Department in 1973, when Israel
failed to see that Egypt and Syria were preparing for war. He has
written this book – another version of which was published
in Hebrew in 2006 – in order to refute the decision of the
Agranat Commission, set up in the wake of the war, to blame him
for this expensive intelligence failure and call for his dismissal.
He shows that preparations by Egyptian and Syrian forces were closely
followed on the days leading up to the war, but the intentions of
enemy leaders were not known until the morning before the attack,
and Israeli political leadership’s commitment to certain security
concepts caused it to misread what was about to occur. Shalev identifies
errors, including a misunderstanding of the Egyptian president’s
personality, which contributed to the failure, and he suggests ways
of avoiding similar mistakes. This solid though repetitive study,
based on written assessments coming from the Research Department
before war, will be useful to students of the Arab–Israeli
conflict and of intelligence assessment in general. Recommended.”
Choice
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Publication Details
Hardback ISBN: |
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978-1-84519-370-6 |
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Page Extent / Format: |
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304 pp. / 229 x 152 mm |
Release Date: |
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May 2010 |
| Illustrated: |
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No |
Hardback Price: |
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£75.00 / $115.00 |
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| This book can be ordered online or by telephone. |
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For the UK and Rest of the World:
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