Preface
and Outline of the Book
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
CHAPTER 1
The Arab–Israeli Conflict Escalates, 1957–1963: A Turning
Point in the Arab States’ Attitudes towards the Palestinian
Problem
The Egyptian Strategy
Qasim’s Strategy
Jordan’s Strategy
The Syrian Ba‘th Strategy
CHAPTER 2
Formulation of Arab Strategy in the Israeli–Arab Conflict,
1964–1965: Prelude to the Six Day War
Part I The Intensification of Arab Activity, 1959–1963
The Arab–Israeli Struggle Over Water
Part II The Crystallization of Arab Strategy: Decisions of
the First and Second Arab Summit Conferences, 1964
CHAPTER 3
Failure of the Arab Plan for Diverting the River Jordan’s
Tributaries
Partial Implementation of the Diversion Plan in Lebanon
Syria’s Dilemma in Implementing the Diversion Plan
Conference of the Heads of Arab Delegations to the Mixed Armistice
Commissions
Failure of the Arab Strategy
CHAPTER 4
The Rise of the Palestinians as a Factor in the Arab–Israeli
Conflict
Part I Establishment of the PLO – The Jerusalem Congress,
May 1964
The Egyptian Attitude
The Jordanian Stand
Syria’s Antithesis
Fatah’s Reaction
Palestinian Organizations’ Alignment
Part II Jordan’s Confrontation with the PLO – National Awakening
in the West Bank
Shuqayri’s Goals
The Jordanian Conception
The Confrontation
The Palestinians’ National Awakening in the West Bank: In
the Aftermath of the Samu‘ Raid
Conclusion: The Struggle for Control of the West Bank and
the Fate of the Hashemite Regime
CHAPTER 5
The Fida’iyyun Organizations’ Contribution to the Descent
to the Six Day War
The Emergence of Fatah
The Egyptian Position
The Change in Egypt’s Policy toward Fida’iyyun Activity Syria’s
Position
Jordan’s Dilemma: Between an Israeli Invasion of the West
Bank and the Campaign against Fatah
The Impact of the Samu‘ Raid on Jordan’s Participation in
the War: A Turning Point
CHAPTER 6
The Arab Military Build-Up
The Authority and Status of the UAC and its Commander
Continuing Discussions on the Dispatch of Arab Forces to Jordan
Egypt and the UNEF on the Israeli Border (1965–1966)
The Convening of the ADC in March 1967: Jordan is Again the
Center of Discussion
The UAC’s Contribution to the Build-up of the Arab Armies
The UAC at the Operational Level
The Failure to Establish a Northern Air Theater
The Arab (UAC) Position on Israel’s Nuclear Project
Changes in Jordan’s Position on the Eve of War
Conclusion: The Failure to Establish an Arab “Power Center”
CHAPTER 7
Nasir’s Steps toward the Six Day War: May 13 to June 5, 1967
Assessing Israel’s Intentions
Part I Basic Factors in Syria’s Estimation
Deep Fears of an Israeli Attack
The Soviet Factor
The Syrian Attempt to Drag Egypt into a Military Operation
– The Cairo Agreement, November 4, 1966
The April 7, 1967 Incident and its Repercussions
The Formulation of Syria’s May 12, 1967 Assessment
Part II Nasir and the Arab World March toward War
Strengthening of the Egyptian Commitment to Syria After the
April 7, 1967 Incident
In the Wake of Soviet and Syrian Warnings
The First Stage, May 15–17, 1967: Deterrence and the Evacuation
of UN Forces
The Second Stage, May 18–22, 1967: The Egyptian Front and
the Closing of the Straits
The Third Stage, May 23–28, 1967: Crystallization of the Second-Strike
Strategy
The Fourth Stage, May 29–June 5, 1967: Waiting for the First
Strike
Part III The Arab Propaganda Campaign
Part IV Conclusion and Evaluation
CHAPTER 8
In the Wake of the Six Day War
The Khartoum Summit, August 29–1 September, 1967: A New Arab
Strategy
Conclusion: The Arab–Israeli Conflict between the Nakba and
the Naksa – The Emergence of the New Palestinian National
Movement
Appendixes: Fatah, Jordanian, Egyptian and
Syrian Documents, Letters and Operational Orders in Arabic
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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“A valuable
contribution to the understanding of Arab politics in the decade
before the Six-Day War. Well-referenced and injecting new Iraqi,
Egyptian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Palestinian documents into the
narrative, Shemesh’s book challenges historians’ conventional
wisdom. He argues, for example, that the Palestinian issue was far
more important to Arab states in the decade before the Six-Day War
than earlier historians believed. He also dismisses the idea that
the war occurred because Nasser’s recklessness caused events
to spin out of control. Rather, Shemesh suggests that the January
1964 Arab summit set the region down the path to war. In 1967, Nasser
‘marched to war open-eyed,’ believing Arab victory to
be assured.
…Shemesh also examines both internal Palestinian Arab dynamics and the interplay
of Palestinian nationalism within intra-Arab relations of the period.
Palestinian fida’i terrorism, for example, changed the dynamics
of the Arab fight against Israel. No longer did Arab states alone
seek to eliminate Israel on behalf of Palestinian Arabs; Palestinian
groups began to take an active role in the fight against Israel.
Shemesh argues that while, prior to the Six-Day War, Palestinian
terrorism did not gain the prominence that it would in later years,
by 1965, fida’i activity along Israel’s borders with
Syria and Jordan posed a serious security threat and hastened the
war.
…Shemesh
reproduces facsimiles ranging from a cover of Fatah’s 1959
monthly Filastinuna; to a 1965 Jordanian military report on acts
Palestinian terrorists might perpetrate against Israel; to a 1967
letter from Hafez al-Assad, at the time still Syria’s defense
minister, regarding Israeli troop movements … a necessary
addition to any serious library or scholar's bookshelf." Middle
East Quarterly
“Primarily utilizing Arab primary sources, Shemesh reconstructs
the history of the decade preceding the Six Day War between Israel
on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other. His reliance
on previously unexamined Arab sources leads him to a number of novel
conclusions, the most important of which include the notion that
the Sinai War (of October 1956) had exacerbated rather than alleviated
Arab–Israeli tensions and the Palestinian problem, that Nasir
of Egypt was rational in his preparations for the conflict and that
responsibility for the military fiasco is primarily attributable
to Egyptian Field Marshal Amer, that Egyptian commitment to Palestinian
self-determination was strong and not an opportunistic fig leaf,
that the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was a major trigger
for the conflict, that the defeat of Arab forces in the war prompted
the Arab states to decisively turn towards political processes in
order to resolve the conflict, and that the Israeli seizure of the
West Bank served to strengthen the political regime of Jordan.”
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