Preface
Acknowledgments
1 Historical Background
Ben-Gurion’s Perception of Israel and the Arab World
The French Connection
2 The Kennedy Administration’s “Low
Profile” Policy
Publicizing the Reactor
The First Dialogue with the Kennedy Administration
Great Britain and the Dimona Project
The Ben-Gurion–Kennedy Meeting
3 The Volte-Face in American Policy
Behind the Reversal
The Implementation of the “Crushing” Offensive
4 The Eshkol–Kennedy Dialogue
The Domestic Debate and Ben-Gurion’s Resignation
Renewed American Pressure
A Return to the Low Profile
5 Launching a Dialogue with the Johnson
Administration
The Alleged Security Débâcle
The Initial Eshkol–Johnson Dialogue
6 The Enhanced US–Israel Chemistry
Debates over the Missile Project
The Eshkol–Johnson Meetings of June 1964
7 The Road to the American–Israeli
Memorandum of Understandings
New Appeals to Egypt
Eshkol’s Personal Request
The Harriman–Komer Mission
The Memorandum of Understandings
8 The Monitoring Dispute
The Last US Attempt to Turn Back the Clock
The Post-Election Dialogue
The Representatives’ Visit
Subsequent Discussions on Monitoring
9 The Challenge of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
The Aftermath of the Six Day War
The Phantoms Negotiations
Johnson’s Final Effort toward the NPT
10
Israel’s Nuclear Option: An Assessment
Postscript Israel’s Current Nuclear Policy
Notes
Bibliography
Index
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“The book focuses in considerable detail on the diplomatic
exchanges on arrangements and understandings of the nature, scope,
and monitoring of Israel’s nuclear activity between Israel
and US administrations, which often took a benign view of that activity.
Shalom concludes that this historical account has relevance for
the current US–Israel diplomatic dialogue on nuclear policy
and on arms control.” Choice
“While Israel’s nuclear status has long been an open
secret, the details surrounding the nuclear program and its impact
on the Middle East are complex and elusive. In this book, Zaki Shalom
draws upon a rich collection of primary sources (including some
recently declassified material) to examine the history of Israel’s
nuclear program and its effects on Israel’s strategic and
diplomatic standing in the world. Within that context, Shalom considers
whether Israel should maintain its current nuclear policy or replace
it with a more open one.” Middle East Journal
“Zaki Shalom recounts the US–Israel dialogue on Israel’s
nuclear project, and delineates the limitations a superpower faces
when trying to impose its security agenda on a regional ally. Shalom’s
book is an important contribution to our understanding of the Israeli
nuclear project, and the diplomacy of arms control.” Prof.
Yair Evron, The School of Government and Policy, The Security Studies
Program, Tel Aviv University
“In recent years much of the vaunted 'opacity' of Israel’s
nuclear weapons status has been stripped away by scholars and critics.
In this context, Zaki Shalom contributes a thorough, painstakingly
documented blow-by-blow account of the diplomatic dimension of the
process by which Israel, unbidden, penetrated the nuclear club.
Shalom’s work is exemplary archival research, refreshingly
old-fashioned in its assiduous attention to multiple primary sources,
showing the strengths of a documentary focus even on such a ‘sensitive’
topic. As an established scholar of David Ben-Gurion he is particularly
effective in underlining how Ben-Gurion's audacity was key to the
decision to push ahead; put simply, there was nothing preordained
or certain, in the 1950s and 1960s, about Israel’s seemingly
quixotic pursuit of nuclear capability.” Alan Dowty, Kahanoff
Chair Professor of Israel Studies, University of Calgary
“This solidly researched work is based on an impressive
range of documents. Shalom provides a broad, fascinating picture
that reflects innovative research findings on the major changes
in the administration's thinking on Israel’s 'nuclear option'
and on Eshkol's ability to navigate Israel's nuclear policy wisely,
cautiously and cleverly.” Ha’aretz
“Shalom focuses on the reciprocal relations between Jerusalem
and Washington with regard to Israel’s nuclear program. Building
on Shalom’s and others’ research into this topic, Israel’s
Nuclear Option is the product of an archival search in Israel and
elsewhere and is based on original documents, most of which have
never been hitherto publicly revealed.” Middle East Quarterly
“This book, an English version of the Hebrew original, focuses
on disclosing a mine of information on the secret American–Israeli
discussions on the Israeli nuclear project at Dimona. As such, the
English version is true to the book’s title and should be
acknowledged as an important contribution, not only to the growing
research on Israel’s nuclear history that was missing from
conventional histories for decades but also as a key to understanding
the connection between American domestic and foreign policies in
regard to Israel. The central thesis of the book is that Israel
was able to procure and develop its nuclear ‘option’
between 1957 and the Six Day War ten years later despite both public
and secret efforts by American administrations at the time to stop
nuclear proliferation worldwide, particularly in regard to Israel’s
nuclear option.
The main merit of the book is the large and detailed discussion
of many heretofore closed primary diplomatic sources, mainly American
but also British, French, and Canadian ones.” International
Journal of Middle East Studies
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